The National Super Alliance (Nasa) raised concerns over the upcoming general elections and the voter registration system.
Below is a memorandum from the four Nasa principals to the electoral agency, IEBC.
''1. Introduction
A. The coalition congratulates the new IEBC team on its appointment.B. The coalition expects the new team to deliver on its mandate as per the constitution of Kenya and electoral statutory laws.C. The coalition is willing and open to co-operation with the new IEBC team to ensure that it delivers on its stipulated mandate
2. General Concerns
A. Arising from the 2013 election intrigues the coalition is seeking assurance and confirmation from the new team that there is and shall be only one register of voters.
B. We are seeking assurance in writing that the integrity of the register can be ascertained and that it is acceptable to all parties participating in the elections.
C. Assurance in writing that an independent ICT certification body shall certify the electronic register of voters.
Assurance that the process of appointment of the auditing firm and audit of the register shall be above board, inclusive and acceptable to all stakeholders
D. Assurance that as per the election laws the commission shall vet the secretariat staff and weed out the compromised elements especially but not limited to the following directorates ICT and registration of voters.
E. That the new team should account for the BVR kits that was in possession of the ousted team. Since 2013 the ousted IEBC team managed stocks of BVR kits in an opaque and suspicious manner. the following should therefore be addressed
1.A detailed stock report accounting for each and every kit that was in possession of IEBC in the lead up and after the 2013 elections.
2.The terms and conditions under which BVR kits were loaned to Burundi.
3.the terms and conditions under which BVR kits were “donated” to state departments including the ministry of devolution and more specifically to the NYS program.
4.Explanation on the connection between the BVR kits donated to the NYS program and the unauthorized registration of youths who participated in the program who as of now “stand ineligible to be registered” based on the foregoin.
5.Furnish the coalition with the number of Huduma Centres that are being used in the registration process as well as information shared with third parties including its parent state ministry responsible for devolution, including data base or bases those kits were interfaced with or hooked into or with, as well as number of voters handled by each Huduma Centre etc.
6.Furnish the coalition with details of the interface that currently exist between IEBC and state organs/machinery including the NIS.
3.0 Integrity of the register of voters
One of the corner stones of credible elections is the integrity of the voters’ register. the various components that will affect the integrity of the voters’ register include, resolving the issues related to the 2013 register (s); the right and process of acquiring identity cards and /or passports; the process of registration; removing inaccuracies from the previous register; safeguarding those in the previous register; the process of removing dead voters, etc. the coalition demands answers on the following;
1. Integrity of the register of voters. The key used in creating the current register does not have unique identifiers leading to multiple registrants sharing the same id number. This has completely undermined the credibility of the register. Registration details in the register are not unique to an individual.
2. On the registrar of births and deaths: in the briefing to political parties yesterday, the commission CEO put forward that the commission had written formally to the registrar in November of last year for an updated list of all deaths.The IEBC needed this list to compare with their voter register so as to clean up dead voters off the register. The CEO claims that the registrar responded painting a very grim picture regarding the accuracy of their database on deaths especially. The registrar of births and deaths, by their own admission, puts forward that they do not have a list that can be relied upon. This brings to the fore two issues:
(a) The modalities surrounding the proposed audit of the register; the IEBC initially intended to perform part of the audit by comparison their register against this list. Given the above admission by the registrar, this kind of audit is clearly no longer tenable.
b) What alternatives does the commission intend to use to achieve the intended objective in the absence of credible and authentic data from the registrar of births and deaths.(b) The biometric identification of voters on Election Day; given the reality of section 44(a) which provides for a "complementary mode" of voter identification and results transmission, it would be important to get clarity from the commissioners on what they interpret this "complementary mode" to be. Is it necessarily manual identification as is the assumption by jubilee or could it be comparison of a national identity card image against the image captured by the BVR kit during registration? The latter is a viable option in the event that fingerprint recognition fails for some voters. For purposes of accountability, we could request that it be a requirement that any such case would only be permitted to vote following the counter verification by agents to verify that indeed the person present is the one registered to vote. This can be done in the election regulations which are due to be published tomorrow.3. Audit of the register. We propose a multi-pronged stakeholder audit of the register to ensure that the register is accurate, verifiable and accountable.
4. Voter identification. The main thrust of plans to rig the elections is founded on inflated numbers of registrants in jubilee strongholds. These “registrants” need not necessarily be existing or live humans. Their aim is to enlarge the numbers in their stronghold to enable ballooning of numbers during results declaration. We therefore demand that only electronic identification of voters be entertained on Election Day. The complementary mechanism referred to in section 44 must be defined, known and agreed upon before the first ballot is cast. The commission needs to demonstrate at this stage that the electronic identification actually works.
5. Technical committee on ICT: section 44 of the elections amendments act provides for the establishment of the technical committee on ICT. This committee has reasonable powers to oversight all matters relating to application of technology in the elections and specifically section 44(5).
The opposition if highly disadvantaged in this committee due to the following reasons.
i. Under-representation in a committee populated by jubilee leaning representatives drawn from government agencies.ii. It operates in an opaque manner and its agenda is largely driven by jubilee.iii. The designated opposition representation is based on parliamentary representation and hence political as opposed to technical.iv. The coalition demands to be given a minimum of two slots so that they can appoint ICT experts to represent their interests
6. Declaration of results at the constituency level. The commission must accept finality of results declared at the constituency level. Persons involved in the electoral process should be able to conduct their own tallies based on constituencies declared results and give projections of a winner. The controlled and centralized national tallying centre will in this case only apply to declaring official results.
7. Selection of returning officers. The coalition demands a transparent mode of selecting constituency returning officers. This should be open balloting in a public place in the presence of political party representatives and the public to be deployed in determining how to deploy ROs to their respective constituencies.
8. Technical staff of the commission. The former commissioners were disgraced for mismanaging the electoral process and removed from office. These commissioners were supported by a technical team especially at the senior level. The voter register is in shambles at the moment. The ICT component of elections is weak. The coalition demands that the heads of registration and ICT having failed to oversee a credible registration process should not be part of the preparations for the next general elections. Exit of commissioners dealt with the head but the supporting spine in the secretariat is still intact.
9. DiasporaThe commission has indicated that it intends to register and conduct elections for the diaspora in Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and South Africa.The coalition requests the commission to disclose the potential number of voters to be registered, the status on the validity of their passports and to reiterate their commitment to only register people using valid passports contrary to the recommendations of the thematic group on diaspora voting.
We call upon the commission to publicly publish the list of passport holders residing in the target countries.
The coalition further rejects the recommendation by the thematic group to register voters using any document other than passports.
10. since the office of the registrar of persons is critical to the registration process and given the anomalies so far witnessed including shared id numbers and use of fake ids to register persons – the coalition demands answers on the following;
a. What relationship exists between the IEBC and the office of the registrar of persons? Does the IEBC have access or an interface with the registrar of persons’ data base? If it does, what form or nature of access does it have? If not, why not?
b. Do other government agencies have access to the same data base? If yes, which government agencies are they? And what form or nature of access is it?
c. Is such access extended to other third parties? For instance, banks and telecommunication companies.
d. The office of registrar of persons need to publish details of Kenyans issued with identification cards since 2013 with complete details on counties/constituencies, by numbers of applicants, by issuance and collection dates, numbers of uncollected i.ds by constituencies, et cetera.
e. Given the admission by IEBC that there are more than 120,000 registered voters with similar identification card numbers, how did that happen? What implication does this double id registration have to credible elections?
Similar questions may be raised on the immigration department since passports are also being used to register as well.
The issues raised herein are made in good faith and we look forward to the commission officially responding to the same in writing within the shortest time possible.Signed:Hon. Musalia Mudavadi, EGH Sen Moses WetangulaH.E. Dr. Kalonzo MusyokaRt. Hon. Raila Odinga, EGH''
[Caption: NASA leaders at a past Bomet rally. /Photo/facebook.com]